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Abstract
We develop a Bayesian model for decision-making under time pressure with en-
dogenous information acquisition. In our model, the decision-maker decides
when to observe (costly) information by sampling an underlying continuous-
time stochastic process (time series) that conveys information about the potential
occurrence/non-occurrence of an adverse event which will terminate the decision-
making process. In her attempt to predict the occurrence of the adverse event, the
decision-maker follows a policy that determines when to acquire information from
the time series (continuation), and when to stop acquiring information and make
a final prediction (stopping). We show that the optimal policy has a ”rendezvous”
structure, i.e. a structure in which whenever a new information sample is gathered
from the time series, the optimal ”date” for acquiring the next sample becomes
computable. The optimal interval between two information samples balances a
trade-off between the decision maker’s ”surprise”, i.e. the drift in her posterior
belief after observing new information, and ”suspense”, i.e. the probability that
the adverse event occurs in the time interval between two information samples.
Moreover, we characterize the continuation and stopping regions in the decision-
maker’s state-space, and show that they depend not only on the decision-maker’s
beliefs, but also on the ”context”, i.e. the current realization of the time series.
1 Introduction
The problem of timely risk assessment and decision-making based on a sequentially observed time
series is ubiquitous, with applications in finance, medicine, cognitive science and signal processing
[1-7]. A common setting that arises in all these domains is that a decision-maker, provided with
sequential observations of a time series, needs to decide whether or not an adverse event (e.g. finan-
cial crisis, clinical acuity for ward patients, etc) will take place in the future. The decision-maker’s
recognition of a forthcoming adverse event needs to be timely, for that a delayed decision may hin-
der effective intervention (e.g. delayed admission of clinically acute patients to intensive care units
can lead to mortality [5]). In the context of cognitive science, this decision-making task is known
as the two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) task [15]. Insightful structural solutions for the optimal
Bayesian 2AFC decision-making policies have been derived in [9-16], most of which are inspired
by the classical work of Wald on sequential probability ratio tests (SPRT) [8].
In this paper, we present a Bayesian decision-making model in which a decision-maker adaptively
decides when to gather (costly) information from an underlying time series in order to accumulate
evidence on the occurrence/non-occurrence of an adverse event. The decision-maker operates under
time pressure: occurrence of the adverse event terminates the decision-making process. Our abstract
model is motivated and inspired by many practical decision-making tasks such as: constructing tem-
poral patterns for gathering sensory information in perceptual decision-making [1], scheduling lab
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tests for ward patients in order to predict clinical deterioration in a timely manner [3, 5], designing
breast cancer screening programs for early tumor detection [7], etc.
We characterize the structure of the optimal decision-making policy that prescribes when should
the decision-maker acquire new information, and when should she stop acquiring information and
issue a final prediction. We show that the decision-maker’s posterior belief process, based on which
policies are prescribed, is a supermartingale that reflects the decision-maker’s tendency to deny
the occurrence of an adverse event in the future as she observes the survival of the time series for
longer time periods. Moreover, the information acquisition policy has a ”rendezvous” structure;
the optimal ”date” for acquiring the next information sample can be computed given the current
sample. The optimal schedule for gathering information over time balances the information gain
(surprise) obtained from acquiring new samples, and the probability of survival for the underlying
stochastic process (suspense). Finally, we characterize the continuation and stopping regions in the
decision-maker’s state-space and show that, unlike previous models, they depend on the time series
”context” and not just the decision-maker’s beliefs.
Related Works Mathematical models and analyses for perceptual decision-making based on
sequential hypothesis testing have been developed in [9-17]. Most of these models use tools
from sequential analysis developed by Wald [8] and Shiryaev [21, 22]. In [9,13,14], optimal
decision-making policies for the 2AFC task were computed by modelling the decision-maker’s
sensory evidence using diffusion processes [20]. These models assume an infinite time horizon for
the decision-making policy, and an exogenous supply of sensory information.
The assumption of an infinite time horizon was relaxed in [10] and [15], where decision-making is
assumed to be performed under the pressure of a stochastic deadline; however, these deadlines were
considered to be drawn from known distributions that are independent of the hypothesis and the
realized sensory evidence, and the assumption of an exogenous information supply was maintained.
In practical settings, the deadlines would naturally be dependent on the realized sensory information
(e.g. patients’ acuity events are correlated with their physiological information [5]), which induces
more complex dynamics in the decision-making process. Context-based decision-making models
were introduced in [17], but assuming an exogenous information supply and an infinite time horizon.
The notions of “suspense” and “surprise” in Bayesian decision-making have also been recently
introduced in the economics literature (see [18] and the references therein). These models use
measures for Bayesian surprise, originally introduced in the context of sensory neuroscience [19],
in order to model the explicit preference of a decision-maker to non-instrumental information. The
goal there is to design information disclosure policies that are suspense-optimal or surprise-optimal.
Unlike our model, such models impose suspense (and/or surprise) as a (behavioral) preference of the
decision-maker, and hence they do not emerge endogenously by virtue of rational decision making.
2 Timely Decision Making with Endogenous Information Acquisition
Time Series Model The decision-maker has access to a time-series X(t) modeled as a continuous-
time stochastic process that takes values in R, and is defined over the time domain t ∈ R+, with an
underlying filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft}t∈R+ ,P). The process X(t) is naturally adapted
to {Ft}t∈R+ , and hence the filtration Ft abstracts the information conveyed in the time series real-
ization up to time t. The decision-maker extracts information from X(t) to guide her actions over
time.
We assume that X(t) is a stationary Markov process1, with a stationary transition kernel
Pθ (X(t) ∈ A|Fs) = Pθ (X(t) ∈ A|X(s)) , ∀A ⊂ R, ∀s < t ∈ R+, where θ is a realization
of a latent Bernoulli random variable Θ ∈ {0, 1} (unobservable by the decision-maker), with
P(Θ = 1) = p. The distributional properties of the paths of X(t) are determined by θ, since
the realization of θ decides which Markov kernel (Po or P1) generates X(t). If the realization θ is
equal to 1, then an adverse event occurs almost surely at a (finite) random time τ , the distribution of
which is dependent on the realization of the path (X(t))0≤t≤τ .
1Most of the insights distilled from our results would hold for more general dependency structures. How-
ever, we keep this assumption to simplify the exposition and maintain the tractability and interpretability of the
results.
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Figure 1: An exemplary stopped sample path for Xτ (t)|Θ = 1, with an exemplary partition Pt.
The decision-maker’s ultimate goal is to sequentially observe X(t), and infer θ before the adverse
event happens; inference is obsolete if it is declared after τ . Since Θ is latent, the decision-maker is
unaware whether the adverse event will occur or not, i.e. whether her access to X(t) is temporary
(τ < ∞ for θ = 1) or permanent (τ = ∞ for θ = 0). In order to model the occurrence of the
adverse event; we define τ as an F -stopping time for the process X(t), for which we assume the
following:
• The stopping time τ |Θ = 1 is finite almost surely, whereas τ |Θ = 0 is infinite almost
surely, i.e. P (τ <∞|Θ = 1) = 1, and P (τ =∞|Θ = 0) = 1.
• The stopping time τ |Θ = 1 is accessible2, with a Markovian dependency on history, i.e.
P (τ < t| Fs) = P (τ < t|X(s)) , ∀s < t, where P (τ < t|X(s)) is an injective map from
R to [0, 1] and P (τ < t|X(s)) is non-decreasing in X(s).
Thus, unlike the stochastic deadline models in [10] and [15], the decision deadline in our model (i.e.
occurrence of the adverse event) is context-dependent as it depends on the time series realization
(i.e. P (τ < t|X(s)) is not independent of X(t) as in [15]). We use the notation Xτ (t) = X(t∧τ),
where t ∧ τ = min{t, τ} to denote the stopped process to which the decision-maker has ac-
cess. Throughout the paper, the measures Po and P1 assign probability measures to the paths
Xτ (t)|Θ = 0 and Xτ(t)|Θ = 1 respectively, and we assume that Po << P13.
Information The decision-maker can only observe a set of (costly) samples of Xτ (t) rather
than the full continuous path. The samples observed by the decision-maker are captured by
partitioning X(t) over specific time intervals: we define Pt = {to, t1, . . ., tN(Pt)−1}, with
0 ≤ to < t1 < . . . < tN(Pt)−1 ≤ t, as a size-N(Pt) partition of Xτ (t) over the interval [0, t],
where N(Pt) is the total number of samples in the partition Pt. The decision-maker observes the
values that Xτ (t) takes at the time instances in Pt; thus the sequence of observations is given by the
process X(Pt) =
∑N(Pt)−1
i=0 X(ti)δti , where δti is the Dirac measure. The space of all partitions
over the interval [0, t] is denoted by Pt = [0, t]N. We denote the probability measures for partitioned
paths generated under Θ = 0 and 1 with a partition Pt as P˜o(Pt) and P˜1(Pt) respectively.
Since the decision-maker observes Xτ (t) through the partition Pt, her information at time t is
conveyed in the σ-algebra σ(Xτ (Pt)) ⊂ Ft. The stopping event is observable by the decision-
maker even if τ /∈ Pτ . We denote the σ-algebra generated by the stopping event as St = σ
(
1{t≥τ}
)
.
Thus, the information that the decision-maker has at time t is expressed by the filtration F˜t =
σ(Xτ (Pt)) ∨ St, and it follows that any decision-making policy needs to be F˜t-measurable.
Figure 1 depicts a Brownian path (a sample path of a Wiener process, which satisfies all the
assumptions of our model)4, with an exemplary partition Pt over the time interval [0, 1]. The
decision-maker observes the samples in X(Pt) sequentially, and reasons about the realization of
the latent variable Θ based on these samples and the process survival, i.e. at t = 0.2, the decision-
2Our analyses hold if the stopping time is totally inaccessible.
3The absolute continuity of Po with respect to P1 means that no sample path of Xτ (t)|Θ = 0 should be
fully revealing of the realization of Θ.
4In Figure 1, the stopping event was simulated as a totally inaccessible first jump of a Poisson process.
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maker’s information resides in the σ-algebra σ(X(0), X(0.1), X(0.15)) generated by the samples
in P0.2 = {0, 0.1, 0.15}, and the σ-algebra generated by the process’ survival S0.2 = σ(1{τ>0.2}).
Policies and Risks The decision-maker’s goal is to come up with a (timely) decision θˆ ∈ {0, 1},
that reflects her prediction for whether the actual realization θ is 0 or 1, before the process Xτ(t)
potentially stops at the unknown time τ . The decision-maker follows a policy: a (continuous-time)
mapping from the observations gathered up to every time instance t to two types of actions:
• A sensing action δt ∈ {0, 1}: if δt = 1, then the decision-maker decides to observe a new
sample from the running process Xτ (t) at time t.
• A continuation/stopping action θˆt ∈ {∅, 0, 1}: if θˆt ∈ {0, 1}, then the decision-maker
decides to stop gathering samples from Xτ (t), and declares a final decision (estimate) for
θ. Whenever θˆt = ∅, the decision-maker continues observing Xτ (t) and postpones her
declaration for the estimate of θ.
A policy π = (πt)t∈R+ is a (F˜t-measurable) mapping rule that maps the information in F˜t to an
action tuple πt = (δt, θˆt) at every time instance t. We assume that every single observation that the
decision-maker draws from Xτ(t) entails a fixed cost, hence the process (δt)t∈R+ has to be a point
process under any optimal policy5. We denote the space of all such policies by Π.
A policy π generates the following random quantities as a function of the paths Xτ(t) on the prob-
ability space (Ω,F , {Ft}t∈R+ ,P):
1- A stopping time Tpi: The first time at which the decision-maker declares its estimate for θ, i.e.
Tpi = inf{t ∈ R+ : θˆt ∈ {0, 1}}.
2- A decision (estimate of θ) θˆpi: Given by θˆpi = θˆTpi∧τ .
3- A random partition P piTpi : A realization of the point process (δt)t∈R+ , comprising a finite set of
strictly increasing F -stopping times at which the decision-maker decides to sample the path Xτ (t).
A loss function is associated with every realization of the policy π, representing the overall
cost incurred when following that policy for a specific path Xτ(t). The loss function is given by
ℓ (π; Θ) , (C1 1{θˆpi=0,θ=1}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Type I error
+Co 1{θˆpi=1,θ=0}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Type II error
+Cd Tpi︸ ︷︷ ︸
Delay
)1{Tpi≤τ}+ Cr 1{Tpi>τ}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Deadline missed
+CsN(P
pi
Tpi∧τ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Information
,
(1)
where C1 is the cost of type I error (failure to anticipate the adverse event), Co is the cost of type II
error (falsely predicting that an adverse event will occur), Cd is the cost of the delay in declaring the
estimate θˆpi, Cr is the cost incurred when the adverse event occurs before an estimate θˆpi is declared
(cost of missing the deadline), and Cs is the cost of every observation sample (cost of information).
The risk of each policy π is defined as its expected loss
R(π) , E [ℓ (π; Θ)] , (2)
where the expectation is taken over the paths of Xτ (t). In the next section, we characterize the
structure of the optimal policy π∗ = arg infpi∈ΠR(π).
3 Structure of the Optimal Policy
Since the decision-maker’s posterior belief at time t, defined as µt = P(Θ = 1| F˜t), is an impor-
tant statistic for designing sequential policies [10, 21-22], we start our characterization for π∗ by
investigating the belief process (µt)t∈R+ .
3.1 The Posterior Belief Process
Recall that the decision-maker distills information from two types of observations: the realization
of the partitioned time series Xτ(Pt) (i.e. the information in σ(Xτ (Pt))), and 2) the survival of the
5Note that the cost of observing any local continuous path is infinite, hence any optimal policy must have
(δt)t∈R+ being a point process to keep the number of observed samples finite.
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Figure 2: Depiction for exemplary belief paths of different policies under Θ = 1.
process up to time t (i.e. the information in St). In the following Theorem, we study the evolution
of the decision-maker’s beliefs as she integrates these pieces of information over time6.
Theorem 1 (Information and beliefs). Every posterior belief trajectory (µt)t∈R+ associated with
a policy π ∈ Π that creates a partition P pit ∈ Pt of Xτ (t) is a ca`dla`g path given by
µt =
{
1, for t ≥ τ(
1 + 1−pp
dP˜o(P
pi
t
)
dP˜1(Ppit )
)−1
, for 0 ≤ t < τ
where dP˜o(P
pi
t
)
dP˜1(Ppit )
is the Radon-Nikodym derivative7 of the measure P˜o(P pit ) with respect to P˜1(P pit ),
and is given by the following elementary predictable process
1
dP˜o(Ppit )
dP˜1(Ppit )
=
N(Ppi
t
)−1∑
k=1
P(X(P pit )|Θ = 1)
P(X(P pit )|Θ = 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Likelihood ratio
P(τ > t|σ(X(P pit ),Θ = 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Survival probability
1{Ppi
t
(k)≤t≤Ppi
t
(k+1)},
for t ≥ P pit (1), and pP(τ > t|Θ = 1) for t < P pit (k). Moreover, the path (µt)t∈R+ has exactly
N(P piTpi∧τ ) + 1{τ<∞} jumps at the time indexes in P pit∧τ ∪ {τ}.
Proof: The posterior belief process (µt)t∈R+ is given by
µt = P(Θ = 1|F˜t)
(a)
= P(Θ = 1|σ(X(P pit )),St)
= 1{t≥τ} · P(Θ = 1|σ(X(P
pi
t )), t ≥ τ) + 1{t<τ} · P(Θ = 1|σ(X(P
pi
t )), t < τ)
(b)
= 1{t≥τ} + 1{t<τ} · P(Θ = 1|σ(X(P
pi
t )), t < τ), (3)
where we have used the fact that F˜t = σ(X(P pit )) ∨ St in (a), and the fact that the event {t ≥ τ}
is F˜t-measurable in (b), and hence P(Θ = 1|σ(X(P pit )), t ≥ τ) = 1. Therefore, we can write the
posterior belief process (µt)t∈R+ in the following form
µt =
{
1, for t ≥ τ
P(Θ = 1|σ(X(P pit )), t < τ), for0 ≤ t < τ.
6All proofs are provided in the supplementary material
7Since we impose the condition Po << P1 and fix a partition Pt, then the Radon-Nikodym derivative exists.
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Now we focus on computing P(Θ = 1|σ(X(P pit )), t < τ). Note that using Bayes’ rule, we have
that
P(Θ = 1|σ(X(P pit )), t < τ) =
P(Θ = 1, σ(X(P pit )), t < τ)
P(σ(X(P pit )), t < τ)
=
P(Θ = 1, σ(X(P pit )), t < τ)∑
θ∈{0,1} P(Θ = θ, σ(X(P
pi
t )), t < τ)
=
dP(σ(X(P pit )), t < τ |Θ = 1)P(Θ = 1)∑
θ∈{0,1} dP(σ(X(P
pi
t )), t < τ |Θ = θ)P(Θ = θ)
=
dP(σ(X(P pit )), t < τ |Θ = 1)P(Θ = 1)
dP(σ(X(P pit )), t < τ |Θ = 0)P(Θ = 0) + dP(σ(X(P
pi
t )), t < τ |Θ = 1)P(Θ = 1)
=
p dP(σ(X(P pit )), t < τ |Θ = 1)
(1− p) dP(σ(X(P pit )), t < τ |Θ = 0) + p dP(σ(X(P
pi
t )), t < τ |Θ = 1)
=
(
1 +
1− p
p
·
dP(σ(X(P pit )), t < τ |Θ = 0)
dP(σ(X(P pit )), t < τ |Θ = 1)
)−1
=
(
1 +
1− p
p
·
dP˜o(P
pi
t )
dP˜1(P pit )
)−1
, (4)
where the existence of the Radon-Nykodim derivative dP˜o(P
pi
t
)
dP˜1(Ppit )
follows from the fact that
P˜o(P
pi
t ) << P˜1(P
pi
t ). Hence, we have that
µt =
{
1, for t ≥ τ(
1 + 1−pp ·
dP˜o(P
pi
t
)
dP˜1(Ppit )
)−1
, for 0 ≤ t < τ.
Now we focus on evaluating dP˜o(P
pi
t
)
dP˜1(Ppit )
. Using a further application of Bayes’ rule we have that(
dP˜o(P
pi
t )
dP˜1(P pit )
)−1
=
dP(σ(X(P pit )), t < τ |Θ = 1)
dP(σ(X(P pit )), t < τ |Θ = 0)
=
P(t < τ |X(P pit ),Θ = 1) · dP(X(P
pi
t )|Θ = 1)
P(t < τ |X(P pit ),Θ = 0) · dP(X(P
pi
t )|Θ = 0)
=
dP(X(P pit )|Θ = 1)
dP(X(P pit )|Θ = 0)
· P(t < τ |X(P pit ),Θ = 1), (5)
where we have used the fact that P(t < τ |X(P pit ),Θ = 0) = 1. For any partition P pit , the likelihood
ratio dP(X(P
pi
t
)|Θ=1)
dP(X(Ppi
t
)|Θ=0) is an elementary predictable process that takes an initial value that is equal to
the prior p (when no samples are initially observed), and then takes constant values of dP(X(Ppit )|Θ=1)dP(X(Ppi
t
)|Θ=0)
in the interval between any two samples in the partition (only when a new sample is observed, the
likelihood is updated). Hence, we have that
dP(X(P pit )|Θ = 1)
dP(X(P pit )|Θ = 0)
= p1{t=0} +
N(Ppi
t
)−1∑
k=1
P(X(P pit )|Θ = 1)
P(X(P pit )|Θ = 0)
1{Ppi
t
(k−1)≤t≤Ppi
t
(k)}.
The process is predictable since the likelihood remains constant as long as no new samples are
observed. Modulated by the survival probability,
(
dP˜o(P
pi
t
)
dP˜1(Ppit )
)−1
can be written as
pP(τ > t|Θ = 1)1{t<Ppi
t
(k)}+
N(Ppi
t
)−1∑
k=1
P(X(P pit )|Θ = 1)
P(X(P pit )|Θ = 0)
P(τ > t|σ(X(P pit ),Θ = 1) 1{Ppit (k)≤t≤Ppit (k+1)}.
Under usual regularity conditions on P(τ > t|σ(X(P pit ),Θ = 1) it is easy to see that
(
dP˜o(P
pi
t
)
dP˜1(Ppit )
)−1
will have jumps only at the time instances in the partition P pit and at the stopping time τ , i.e. a total
of N(P piTpi∧τ ) + 1{τ<∞} jumps at the time indexes in P pit∧τ ∪ {τ}. 
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Theorem 1 says that every belief path is right-continuous with left limits, and has jumps at the time
indexes in the partition P pit , whereas between each two jumps, the paths (µt)t∈[t1,t2), t1, t2 ∈ P pit are
predictable (i.e. they are known ahead of time once we know the magnitudes of the jumps preceding
them). This means that the decision-maker obtains ”active” information by probing the time series
to observe new samples (i.e. the information in σ(Xτ (Pt))), inducing jumps that revive her be-
liefs, whereas the progression of time without witnessing a stopping event offers the decision-maker
”passive information” that is distilled just from the costless observation of the process’ survival.
Both sources of information manifest themselves in terms of the likelihood ratio, and the survival
probability in the expression of dP˜o(P
pi
t
)
dP˜1(Ppit )
above.
In Figure 2, we plot the ca`dla`g belief paths for policies π1 and π2, where P pi1 ⊂ P pi2 (i.e.
policy π1 observe a subset of the samples observed by π2). We also plot the (predictable) belief
path of a wait-and-watch policy that observes no samples. We can see that π2, which has more
jumps of ”active information”, copes faster with the truthful belief over time. Between each two
jumps, the belief process exhibits a non-increasing predictable path until fed with a new piece of
information. The wait-and-watch policy has its belief drifting away from the prior p = 0.5 towards
the wrong belief µt = 0 since it only distills information from the process survival, which favors
the hypothesis Θ = 0. This discussion motivates the introduction of the following key quantities.
Information gain (surprise) It(∆t): The amount of drift in the decision-maker’s belief at time
t + ∆t with respect to her belief at time t, given the information available up to time t, i.e.
It(∆t) = (µt+∆t − µt) |F˜t.
Posterior survival function (suspense) St(∆t): The probability that a process generated
with Θ = 1 survives up to time t + ∆t given the information observed up to time t, i.e.
St(∆t) = P(τ > t + ∆t|F˜t,Θ = 1). The function St(∆t) is a non-increasing function in ∆t, i.e.
∂St(∆t)
∂∆t ≤ 0.
That is, the information gain is the amount of “surprise” that the decision-maker experiences in
response to a new information sample expressed in terms of the change in here belief, i.e. the jumps
in µt, whereas the survival probability (suspense) is her assessment for the risk of having the adverse
event taking places in the next ∆t time interval. As we will see in the next subsection, the optimal
policy would balance the two quantities when scheduling the times to sense Xτ (t).
We conclude our analysis for the process µt by noting that the lack of information samples creates
bias towards the belief that Θ = 0 (e.g. see the belief path of the wait-and-watch policy in Figure
2). We formally express this behavior in the following Corollary.
Corollary 1 (Leaning towards denial). For every policy π ∈ Π, the posterior belief process µt is
a supermartingale with respect to F˜t, where
E[µt+∆t|F˜t] = µt − µ
2
tSt(∆t)(1 − St(∆t)) ≤ µt, ∀∆t ∈ R+.
Proof: Recall that from Theorem 1, we know that the posterior belief process can be written as
µt = 1{t≥τ} + 1{t<τ}P(Θ = 1|F˜t).
Hence, the expected posterior belief at time t+∆t given the information in the filtration F˜t can be
written as
E
[
µt+∆t
∣∣∣F˜t ] = E [1{t+∆t≥τ} + 1{t+∆t<τ}P(Θ = 1|F˜t+∆t) ∣∣∣F˜t ]
= E
[
1{t+∆t≥τ}
∣∣∣F˜t ]+ E [1{t+∆t<τ}P(Θ = 1|F˜t+∆t) ∣∣∣F˜t ]
= P(Θ = 1, t+∆t ≥ τ |F˜t) + P(t+∆t < τ |F˜t) · E
[
P(Θ = 1|F˜t+∆t)
∣∣∣F˜t ∨ {t+∆t < τ}] ,
(6)
and hence E
[
µt+∆t
∣∣∣F˜t ] can be written as
P(t+∆t ≥ τ |F˜t,Θ = 1)·P(Θ = 1|F˜t)+P(t+∆t < τ |F˜t)·E
[
P(Θ = 1|F˜t+∆t)
∣∣∣F˜t ∨ {t+∆t < τ}] ,
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which is equivalent to
E
[
µt+∆t
∣∣∣F˜t ] = (1− St(∆t)) · µt + P(t+∆t < τ |F˜t) · E [P(Θ = 1|F˜t+∆t) ∣∣∣F˜t ∨ {t+∆t < τ}] .
(7)
Furthermore, the term P(t+∆t < τ |F˜t) in the expression above can be expressed as
P(t+∆t < τ |F˜t) = P(t+∆t < τ |F˜t,Θ = 1) · P(Θ = 1|F˜t) + P(t+∆t < τ |F˜t,Θ = 0) · P(Θ = 0|F˜t)
(8)
= St(∆t) · µt + (1− µt).
Therefore, E
[
µt+∆t
∣∣∣F˜t ] can be written as
E
[
µt+∆t
∣∣∣F˜t ] = (1− St(∆t)) · µt + (1− µt + St(∆t) · µt) · E [P(Θ = 1|F˜t+∆t) ∣∣∣F˜t ∨ {t+∆t < τ}] .
(9)
Now it remains to evaluate the term E
[
P(Θ = 1|F˜t+∆t)
∣∣∣F˜t ∨ {t+∆t < τ}] in order to find
E
[
µt+∆t
∣∣∣F˜t ]. We first note that
E
[
P(Θ = 1|F˜t+∆t)
∣∣∣F˜t ∨ {t+∆t < τ}] = E [P(Θ = 1|σ(Xτ (P pit+∆t)), t+∆t < τ) ∣∣∣F˜t ] .
We start evaluating the above by first looking at the term P(Θ = 1|σ(Xτ (P pit+∆t)), t + ∆t < τ).
Using Bayes’ rule, we have that
P(Θ = 1|Xτ(P pit+∆t), t+∆t < τ) =
P(Θ = 1, Xτ(P pit+∆t), t+∆t < τ)
P(Xτ (P pit+∆t), t+∆t < τ)
, (10)
where P(Θ = 1, Xτ(P pit+∆t), t+∆t < τ) can be expanded using successive applications of Bayes’
rule as
P(Θ = 1|Xτ(P pit ), t < τ) · P(X
τ (P pit ), t < τ) · P(t+∆t < τ |Θ = 1, X
τ(P pit ), t < τ)
·dP(Xτ (t+∆t)|Θ = 1, Xτ (P pit ), t+∆t < τ),
which is equivalent to
P(Θ = 1, Xτ(P pit+∆t), t+∆t < τ) = µt · St(∆t) · P(X
τ (P pit ), t < τ) · dP(X
τ (t+∆t)|Θ = 1, Xτ (P pit ), t+∆t < τ)
(11)
Similarly, it is easy to see that
P(Θ = 0, Xτ(P pit+∆t), t+∆t < τ) = (1− µt) · P(X
τ (P pit ), t < τ) · dP(X
τ (t+∆t)|Θ = 0, Xτ(P pit ), t+∆t < τ),
(12)
where again, we have used the fact that P(t + ∆t < τ |Θ = 0, Xτ(P pit ), t < τ) = 1. Now we
re-formulate (10) using Bayes rule to arrive at the following
P(Θ = 1|Xτ(P pit+∆t), t+∆t < τ) =
P(Θ = 1, Xτ(P pit+∆t), t+∆t < τ)∑
θ∈{0,1} P(Θ = θ,X
τ (P pit+∆t), t+∆t < τ)
, (13)
then using (11) and (12), (13) can be further reduced to P(Θ = 1|Xτ(P pit+∆t), t+∆t < τ) =
µt · St(∆t) · dP(Xτ (t+∆t)|Θ = 1, Xτ(P pit ), t+∆t < τ)
µt · St(∆t) · dP(Xτ (t+∆t)|Θ = 1, Xτ(P pit ), t+∆t < τ) + (1− µt) · dP(X
τ (t+∆t)|Θ = 0, Xτ(P pit ), t+∆t < τ)
.
(14)
Finally, we use the expression in (14) to evaluate the term
E
[
P(Θ = 1|σ(Xτ (P pit+∆t)), t+∆t < τ)
∣∣∣F˜t ] as follows
E
[
P(Θ = 1|σ(Xτ (P pit+∆t)), t+∆t < τ)
∣∣∣F˜t ] =
8
∑
θ∈{0,1}
∫
P(Θ = 1|Xτ (P pit+∆t), t+∆t < τ) · dP(X
τ (t+∆t)|Θ = θ,Xτ (P pit ), t+∆t < τ),
which, using (14), can be written as∑
θ∈{0,1}
∫
µt · St(∆t) · dP(Xτ (t+∆t)|Θ = 1, Xτ(P pit ), t+∆t < τ) · dP(X
τ (t+∆t)|Θ = θ,Xτ (P pit ), t+∆t < τ)
µt · St(∆t) · dP(Xτ (t+∆t)|Θ = 1, Xτ (P pit ), t+∆t < τ) + (1− µt) · dP(X
τ (t+∆t)|Θ = 0, Xτ(P pit ), t+∆t < τ)
.
Since ∑
θ∈{0,1}
dP(Xτ (t+∆t)|Θ = θ,Xτ (P pit ), t+∆t < τ) =
µt ·St(∆t) · dP(X
τ (t+∆t)|Θ = 1, Xτ(P pit ), t+∆t < τ)+(1−µt)·dP(X
τ (t+∆t)|Θ = 0, Xτ (P pit ), t+∆t < τ),
then the integral above reduces to∫
µt ·St(∆t) ·dP(X
τ (t+∆t)|Θ = θ,Xτ (P pit ), t+∆t < τ) = µt ·St(∆t)·
∫
dP(Xτ (t+∆t)|Θ = θ,Xτ (P pit ), t+∆t < τ),
and since the conditional density integrates to 1, i.e.
∫
dP(Xτ (t+∆t)|Θ = θ,Xτ (P pit ), t+∆t <
τ) = 1, then we have that
E
[
P(Θ = 1|σ(Xτ (P pit+∆t)), t+∆t < τ)
∣∣∣F˜t ] = µt · St(∆t).
By substituting the above in (9), we arrive at
E
[
µt+∆t
∣∣∣F˜t ] = (1− St(∆t)) · µt + (1− µt + St(∆t) · µt) · E [P(Θ = 1|F˜t+∆t) ∣∣∣F˜t ∨ {t+∆t < τ}]
= (1− St(∆t)) · µt + (1− µt + St(∆t) · µt) · µt · St(∆t)
= µt − µ
2
tSt(∆t)(1 − St(∆t)). (15)
Since St(∆t) ≥ 0, ∀t,∆t ∈ R+, then the term µ2tSt(∆t)(1 − St(∆t)) ≥ 0, and it follows that
E
[
µt+∆t
∣∣∣F˜t ] ≤ µt, ∀t,∆t ∈ R+,
and hence the posterior belief process (µt)t∈R+ is a supermartingale with respect to the filtration
F˜t. 
Thus, unlike classical Bayesian learning models with a belief martingale [18, 21-23], the belief
process in our model is a supermartingale that leans toward decreasing over time. The reason for
this is that in our model, time conveys information. That is, unlike [10] and [15] where the decision
deadline is hypothesis-independent and is almost surely occurring in finite time for any path, in our
model the occurrence of the adverse event is itself a hypothesis, hence observing the survival of the
process is informative and contributes to the evolution of the belief. The informativeness of both the
acquired information samples and process survival can be disentangled using Doob decomposition,
by writing µt as µt = µ˜t+A(µt, St(∆t)), where µ˜t is a martingale, capturing the information gain
from the acquired samples, and A(µt, St(∆t)) is a predictable compensator process [23], capturing
information extracted from the process survival.
3.2 The Optimal Policy
The optimal policy π∗ minimizes the expected risk as defined in (1) and (2) by generating the tuple
of random processes (Tpi, θˆpi, P pit ) in response to the paths of Xτ (t) on (Ω,F , {Ft}t∈R+ ,P) in a
way that ”shapes” a belief process µt that maximizes informativeness, maintains timeliness and
controls cost. In the following, we introduce the notion of a ”rendezvous policy”, then in Theorem
2, we show that the optimal policy π∗ complies with this definition.
Rendezvous policies We say that a policy π is a rendezvous policy, if the random partition P piTpi
constructed by the sequence of sensing actions (δpit )t∈[0,Tpi], is a point process with predictable
jumps, where for every two consecutive jumps at times t and t′ , with t′ > t and t, t′ ∈ P piTpi , we
have that t′ is F˜t-measurable.
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That is, a rendezvous policy is a policy that constructs a sensing schedule (δpit )t∈[0,Tpi ], such that
every time t′ at which the decision-maker acquires information is actually computable using the
information available up to time t, the previous time instance at which information was gathered.
Hence, the decision-maker can decide the next ”date” in which she will gather information directly
after she senses a new information sample. This structure is a natural consequence of the informa-
tion structure in Theorem 1, since the belief paths between every two jumps are predictable, then
they convey no ”actionable” information, i.e. if the decision-maker was to respond to a predictable
belief path, say by sensing or making a stopping decision, then she should have taken that decision
right before the predictable path starts, which leads her to better off by saving the delay cost Cd.
We denote the space of all rendezvous policies by Πr. In the following Theorem, we establish that
the rendezvous structure is optimal.
Theorem 2 (Rendezvous). The optimal policy π∗ is a rendezvous policy (π∗ ∈ Πr).
Proof: Assume a discrete-time version of the problem, where the decision (θˆpit , δpit ) are made
in time steps {0,∆t, 2∆t, . . .}. Define a value function V : N × [0, 1] → R+ as a map from the
current history to the risk of the best policy given the history F˜t as follows:
V (F˜t) , inf(θˆpi,Tpi≥t,PpiTpi⊃Ppit )E
[
ℓ(π; Θ)
∣∣∣F˜t ] ,
and define the action-value function as the value function achieved by taking actions (θˆt, δt), andthen
following the best policy thereafter. That is, when the decision is to continue (i.e. θˆt = ∅), we have
that
Q(F˜t; (θˆt = ∅, δt = 1)) , inf(θˆpi,Tpi≥t,PpiTpi⊃Ppit ,t∈PpiTpi )E
[
ℓ(π; Θ)
∣∣∣F˜t ] ,
and
Q(F˜t; (θˆt = ∅, δt = 0)) , inf(θˆpi,Tpi≥t,PpiTpi⊃Ppit ,t/∈PpiTpi )E
[
ℓ(π; Θ)
∣∣∣F˜t ] .
Based on Bellmans optimality principle [24], we know that the optimal policy has to satisfy the
following in every time step, i.e.
δpi
∗
t = arg infδt∈{0,1}Q(F˜t; (θˆt = ∅, δt)).
Now let us look at the optimal partition on P pi∗Tpi∗ on the discrete time steps {0,∆t, 2∆t, . . .},
and look at an arbitrary realization for P pi∗Tpi∗ . Then we pick two consecutive time indexes in
{0,∆t, 2∆t, . . .}, say n1∆t and n2∆t, with n1 < n2, for which δpi
∗
n1∆t
= δpi
∗
n2∆t
= 1, and
δpi
∗
n∆t = 0, ∀n1 < n < n2. Since the policy is optimal, we know that
arg infδn∆t∈{0,1}Q(F˜n∆t; (θˆn∆t = ∅, δn∆t)) = 0, ∀n1 < n < n2,
and
arg infδn2∆t∈{0,1}Q(F˜n2∆t; (θˆn2∆t = ∅, δn2∆t)) = 1,
which is equivalent to
arg infδn∆t∈{0,1}E
[
ℓ(π; Θ)
∣∣∣F˜n∆t ] = 0, ∀n1 < n < n2,
and
arg infδn2∆t∈{0,1}E
[
ℓ(π; Θ)
∣∣∣F˜n2∆t ] = 1,
which can be further decomposed into
arg infδn∆t∈{0,1}E
[
ℓ(π; Θ)
∣∣∣σ(X(P pi∗n1∆t)) ∨ Sn∆t ] = 0, ∀n1 < n < n2,
and
arg infδn2∆t∈{0,1}E
[
ℓ(π; Θ)
∣∣∣σ(X(P pi∗n1∆t)) ∨ Sn2∆t ] = 1,
since both functions E
[
ℓ(π; Θ)
∣∣σ(X(P pi∗n1∆t)) ∨ Sn∆t ] and E [ℓ(π; Θ) ∣∣σ(X(P pi∗n1∆t)) ∨ Sn2∆t ]
are F˜n1∆t-measurable, then the decision-maker can compute the optimal decision sequence
{δn∆t}
n2
n=n1+1
at time n1∆t. Since this holds for an arbitrary discretization step ∆t, including
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an arbitrarily small step ∆t → 0, it follows that the sensing actions construct a predictable point
process under the optimal policy, which concludes the Theorem. 
A direct implication of Theorem 2 is that the time variable can now be viewed as a state vari-
able, whereas the problem is virtually solved in ”discrete-time” since the decision-maker effectively
jumps from one time instance to another in a discrete manner. Hence, we alter the definition of the
action δt from an indicator variable that indicates sensing the time series at time t, to a ”rendezvous
action” that takes real values, and specifies the time after which the decision-maker would sense
a new sample, i.e. if δt = ∆t, then the decision-maker gathers the new sample at t + ∆t. This
transformation restricts our policy design problem to the space of rendezvous policies Πr, which we
know from Theorem 2 that it contains the optimal policy (i.e. π∗ = arg infpi∈ΠrR(π)).
Having established the result in Theorem 2, in the following Theorem, we characterize the optimal
policy π∗ in terms of the random process (Tpi∗ , θˆpi∗ , P pi
∗
t ) using discrete-time Bellman optimality
conditions [24].
Theorem 3 (The optimal policy). The optimal policy π∗ is a sequence of actions (θˆpi∗t , δpi
∗
t )t∈R+ ,
resulting in a random process (θˆpi∗ , Tpi∗ , P pi
∗
Tpi∗
) with the following properties:
(Continuation and stopping)
1. The process (t, µt, X¯(P pi
∗
t ))t∈R+ is a Markov sufficient statistic for the distribution of
(θˆpi∗ , Tpi∗ , P
pi∗
Tpi∗
), where X¯(P pi∗t ) is the most recent sample in the partition P pi
∗
t , i.e.
X¯(P pi
∗
t ) = X(t
∗), t∗ = maxP pi
∗
t .
2. The policy π∗ recommends continuation, i.e. θˆpi∗t = ∅, as long as the belief µt ∈
C(t, X¯(P pi
∗
t )), where C(t, X¯(P pi
∗
t )), is a time and context-dependent continuation set with
the following properties: C(t′ , X) ⊂ C(t,X), ∀t′ > t, and C(t,X ′) ⊂ C(t,X), ∀X ′ > X .
(Rendezvous and decisions)
1. Whenever µt ∈ C(t, X¯(P pi
∗
t )), and t ∈ P pi
∗
Tpi∗
, then a rendezvous δpi∗t is set as follows
δpi
∗
t = arg infδ∈R+ ((C1 − Co)P(It(δ) ≥ ηt) + C1) St(δ) + Cr (1− St(δ)),
where ηt = C1Co+C1 − µt.
2. Whenever µt /∈ C(t, X¯(P pi
∗
t )), then a decision θˆpi
∗
t = θˆpi∗ ∈ {0, 1} is issued, and is based
on a belief threshold as follows: θˆpi∗ = 1{µt≥ C1Co+C1
}. The stopping time is given by
Tpi∗ = inf{t ∈ R+ : µt /∈ C(t, X¯(P pi
∗
t ))}.
Proof: We start by proving that the optimal decision rule is 1{
µt>
C1
Co+C1
}. Fix an optimal stopping
time Tpi∗ and an optimal partition P pi
∗
Tpi∗
. The optimal decision rule is given by
θˆpi∗ = arg infθˆpiE
[
ℓ(π; Θ)
∣∣∣P pi∗Tpi∗ , Tpi∗ ] ,
which is equivalent to
θˆpi∗ = arg infθˆpiE
[
(C1 1{θˆpi=0,θ=1} + Co 1{θˆpi=1,θ=0} + Cd Tpi∗)1{Tpi∗≤τ} + Cr 1{Tpi∗>τ} + CsN(P
pi∗
Tpi∗∧τ
)
]
,
which by smoothing can be written as
θˆpi∗ = arg infθˆpiE
[
E
[
(C1 1{θˆpi=0,θ=1} + Co 1{θˆpi=1,θ=0} + Cd Tpi∗)1{Tpi∗≤τ} + Cr 1{Tpi∗>τ} + CsN(P
pi∗
Tpi∗∧τ
)
∣∣∣F˜Tpi∗ ]] ,
and hence we have that
θˆpi∗ = arg infθˆpiE
[
E
[
(C1 1{θˆpi=0,θ=1} + Co 1{θˆpi=1,θ=0} + Cd Tpi∗)1{Tpi∗≤τ}
∣∣∣F˜Tpi∗ ]+
E
[
Cr 1{Tpi∗>τ}
∣∣∣F˜Tpi∗ ]+ E [CsN(P pi∗Tpi∗∧τ ) ∣∣∣F˜Tpi∗ ]] .
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Since the terms E
[
Cr 1{Tpi∗>τ}
∣∣∣F˜Tpi∗ ], E [Cd Tpi∗ 1{Tpi∗≤τ} ∣∣∣F˜Tpi∗ ], and
E
[
CsN(P
pi∗
Tpi∗∧τ
)
∣∣∣F˜Tpi∗ ] are the information and delay costs, which do not depend on the
choice of θˆpi, we have that
θˆpi∗ = arg infθˆpiE
[
E
[
(C1 1{θˆpi=0,θ=1} + Co 1{θˆpi=1,θ=0})1{Tpi∗≤τ}
∣∣∣F˜Tpi∗ ]] ,
which can be reduced to the following
θˆpi∗ = arg infθˆpiE
[
E
[
(C1 1{θˆpi=0,θ=1} + Co 1{θˆpi=1,θ=0})1{Tpi∗≤τ}
∣∣∣F˜Tpi∗ ]]
= arg infθˆpiE
[
C1 · E
[
1{θˆpi=0,θ=1} · 1{Tpi∗≤τ}
∣∣∣F˜Tpi∗ ]+ Co · E [1{θˆpi=1,θ=0} · 1{Tpi∗≤τ} ∣∣∣F˜Tpi∗ ]]
= arg infθˆpiE
[
C1 · E
[
1{θˆpi=0} · 1{θ=1} · 1{Tpi∗≤τ}
∣∣∣F˜Tpi∗ ]+ Co · E [1{θˆpi=1} · 1{θ=0} · 1{Tpi∗≤τ} ∣∣∣F˜Tpi∗ ]] .
(16)
Since 1{θˆpi=θ} is an F˜Tpi∗ -measurable function, we have that
θˆpi∗ = arg infθˆpiE
[
C1 · E
[
1{θˆpi=0} · 1{θ=1} · 1{Tpi∗≤τ}
∣∣∣F˜Tpi∗ ]+ C1 · E [1{θˆpi=1} · 1{θ=0} · 1{Tpi∗≤τ} ∣∣∣F˜Tpi∗ ]]
= arg infθˆpiE
[
C1 · 1{θˆpi=0} · E
[
1{θ=1} · 1{Tpi∗≤τ}
∣∣∣F˜Tpi∗ ]+ Co · 1{θˆpi=1} · E [1{θ=0} · 1{Tpi∗≤τ} ∣∣∣F˜Tpi∗ ]]
= arg infθˆpiE
[
C1 · 1{θˆpi=0} · (1− µTpi∗ ) + Co · 1{θˆpi=1} · µTpi∗
]
= arg infθˆpiE
[
C1 · 1{θˆpi=0} · (1− µTpi∗ ) + Co · 1{θˆpi=1} · µTpi∗
]
, (17)
which is simply minimized by setting θˆpi = 1 whenever C1(1 − µTpi∗ ) > CoµTpi∗ , hence we have
that θˆpi = 1{}.
Now we resume by first defining the value and the action-value functions, and find the policy char-
acteristics under Bellman optimality conditions.
Define a value function V : N× [0, 1]→ R+ as a map from the current history to the risk of the best
policy given the history F˜t as follows:
V (F˜t) , inf(θˆpi,Tpi≥t,PpiTpi⊃Ppit )E
[
ℓ(π; Θ)
∣∣∣F˜t ] ,
and define the action-value function as the value function achieved by taking actions (θˆt, δt), and
then following the best policy thereafter, i.e.
Q(F˜t; (θˆt, δt)) , inf(θˆpi,Tpi≥t+δt,PpiTpi⊃Ppit ∪{t+δt})E
[
ℓ(π; Θ)
∣∣∣F˜t ] .
Bellman optimality condition requires that at any time step t, we have
(θˆpi
∗
t , δ
pi∗
t ) = arg inf(θˆt,δt)∈{0,1}×R+Q(F˜t; (θˆt, δt)).
Recall from the proof of Corollary 1 that the belief process follows the following dynamics
µt+∆t =
µt · St(∆t) · dP(Xτ (t+∆t)|Θ = 1, Xτ(P pit ), t+∆t < τ)
µt · St(∆t) · dP(Xτ (t+∆t)|Θ = 1, Xτ(P pit ), t+∆t < τ) + (1− µt) · dP(X
τ (t+∆t)|Θ = 0, Xτ(P pit ), t+∆t < τ)
,
which depends only on µt and the most recent sample realization in the partition P pit , which we
denote as X¯τ (P pit ). Hence, the tuple (t, µt, X¯τ (P pit )) is a Markov process sinceXτ (t) is Markovian,
and the belief process follows the above Markovian dynamics, and time is deterministic. Since the
survival probability depends only on X¯τ (P pit ), we can write the action-value function as
Q(F˜t; (θˆt, δt)) , inf(θˆpi,Tpi≥t+δt,PpiTpi⊃Ppit ∪{t+δt})E
[
ℓ(π; Θ)
∣∣µt, X¯τ (P pit )] ,
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and consequently, the optimal actions at every time step t following Bellman conditions are given
by
(θˆpi
∗
t , δ
pi∗
t ) = arg inf(θˆt,δt)∈{0,1}×R+ inf(θˆpi,Tpi≥t+δt,PpiTpi⊃Ppit ∪{t+δt})E
[
ℓ(π; Θ)
∣∣µt, X¯τ (P pit ) ] .
Hence, at any time step t, we only need to know the tuple (t, µt, X¯τ (P pit )) in order to compute
the optimal action-value function, and hence, on the path to the optimal policy, knowing only
(t, µt, X¯
τ (P pit )) suffice to generate the random process (Tpi∗ , P pi
∗
Tpi∗
, θˆpi∗). Hence, (t, µt, X¯τ(P pit )) is
a Markov sufficient statistic for (Tpi∗ , P pi
∗
Tpi∗
, θˆpi∗).
Note that our proof for the optimal decision rule θˆpi∗ implies that the action-value function for
stopping at time t, i.e. θˆpi∗t 6= ∅ is
Q(t, µt, X¯
τ (P pit ); (θˆt 6= ∅, δt)) = Coµt ∧ C1(1 − µt) + Cd t+ CsN(P
pi
t ),
whereas the continuation cost at any time step t is given by finding the optimal rendezvous time
infδt∈R+Q(t, µt, X¯τ(P pit )); (θˆt = ∅, δt)). Therefore, the optimal action-value at any time step t is
given by
Q∗(t, µt, X¯
τ (P pit ); (θˆt 6= ∅, δt)) = min{Coµt∧C1(1−µt)+Cd t+CsN(P
pi
t ), infδt∈R+Q(t, µt, X¯τ (P pit ); (θˆt = ∅, δt))}.
The equation above determines the stopping and continuation conditions, and using the monotonicity
of the survival function in both time t and the time series realizations X¯τ (P pit ), we can show the
monotonicity of the continuation set C(t, X¯τ(P pit )) using the same arguments of Theorem 1 in [15].
The optimal rendezvous can be found by optimizing the time interval such that the cost of stopping
in the next time step is minimized. Hence, we have that
δpi
∗
t = infδt∈R+Q(t, µt, X¯τ (P pit ); (θˆt = ∅, δt))
= infδt∈R+E
[
(Coµt+δt ∧ C1(1− µt+δt) + Cd t+ δt) 1{t+δt<τ} + Cr1{t+δt≥τ} + CsN(P
pi
t ) + 1
∣∣∣F˜t ]
= infδt∈R+
(
(C1 − Co)P(µt+∆t ≥
C1
Co + C1
) + C1
)
St(δt) + Cr(1 − St(δt)), (18)
where P(µt+∆t ≥ C1Co+C1 ) can be written as P(It(∆t) ≥
C1
Co+C1
−µt), where It(∆t) = µt+∆t−µt
is the information gain. 
Theorem 3 establishes the structure of the optimal policy and its prescribed actions in the decision-
maker’s state-space. The first part of the Theorem says that in order to generate the random
tuple (Tpi∗ , θˆpi∗ , P pi
∗
t ) optimally, we only need to keep track of the realization of the process
(t, µt, X¯(Pt))t∈R+ in every time instance. That is, an optimal policy maps the current belief, the
current time, and the most recently observed realization of the time series to an action tuple (θˆpit , δpit ),
i.e. a decision on whether to stop and declare an estimate for θ or sense a new sample. Hence, the
process (t, µt, X¯(Pt))t∈R+ represents the ”state” of the decision-maker, and the decision-maker’s
actions can partially influence the state through the belief process, i.e. a decision on when to ac-
quire the next sample affects the distributional properties of the posterior belief. The remaining state
variables t and X(t) are beyond the decision-maker’s control.
We note that unlike the previous models in [9-16], with the exception of [17], a policy in our model
is context-dependent. That is, since the state is (t, µt, X¯(P pit )) and not just the time-belief tuple
(t, µt), a policy π can recommend different actions for the same belief and at the same time but for
a different context. This is because, while µt captures what the decision-maker learned from the
history, X¯(P pit ) captures her foresightedness into the future, i.e. it can be that the belief µt is not
decisive (e.g. µt ≈ p), but the context is ”risky” (i.e. X¯(P pit ) is large), which means that a potential
forthcoming adverse event is likely to happen in the near future, hence the decision-maker would be
more eager to make a stopping decision and declare an estimate θˆpi. This is manifested through the
dependence of the continuation set C(t, X¯(P pit )) on both time and context; the continuation set is
monotonically decreasing in time due to the deadline pressure, and is also monotonically decreasing
in X¯(P pit ) due to the dependence of the deadline on the time series realization.
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The context dependence of the optimal policy is pictorially depicted in Figure 3 where we show
two exemplary trajectories for the decision-maker’s state, and the actions recommended by a policy
π for the same time and belief, but a different context, i.e. a stopping action recommended when
X(t) is large since it corresponds to a low survival probability, whereas for the same belief and
time, a continuation action can be recommended if X(t) is low since it is safer to keep observing
the process for that the survival probability is high. Such a prescription specifies optimal decision-
making in context-driven settings such as clinical decision-making in critical care environment [3-5],
where a combination of a patient’s length of hospital stay (i.e. t), clinical risk score (i.e. µt) and
current physiological test measurements (i.e. X¯(P pit )) determine the decision on whether or not a
patient should be admitted to an intensive care unit.
Policy pi:
Stop and declare θˆpi
X(t)
θˆpi = 1
Policy pi:
Continue sampling Xτ (t)
t
µt
Sample path 1
Sample path 2
µ¯
t¯
Figure 3: Context-dependence of the decision-making
policy pi. For the same belief and time pair (µ¯, t¯), differ-
ent actions are recommended in different contexts (dif-
ferent sample paths).
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Figure 4: Surprise-suspense trade-off.
The second part of Theorem 3 says that whenever the optimal policy decides to stop gathering
information and issue a conclusive decision, it imposes a threshold on the posterior belief, based on
which it issues the estimate θˆpi∗ ; the threshold is C1Co+C1 , and hence weights the estimates by their
respective risks. When the policy favors continuation, it issues a rendezvous action, i.e. the next time
instance at which information will be gathered. This rendezvous balances surprise and suspense: the
decision-maker prefers maximizing surprise in order to draw the maximum informativeness from
the costly sample it will acquire; this is captured in terms of the tail distribution of the information
gain P(It(δ) ≥ ηt). Maximizing surprise may increase suspense, i.e. the probability of process
termination, which is controlled by the survival function St(δ), and hence it can be that harvesting
the maximum informativeness entails a survival risk when Cr is high. Therefore, the optimal policy
selects a rendezvous δpi∗t that optimizes a combination of the survival risk survival, captured by the
cost Cr and the survival function St(∆t), and the value of information, captured by the costs Co,
C1 and the information gain It(δ).
To get a feel of the surprise-suspense trade-off, we assume that Xτ (t)|Θ = 1 is a standard Brownian
motion, and the prior on Θ = 1 is p = 0.5, whereas the stopping time is the hitting time of a target
level η = 30. When should the decision-maker set the date for the first rendezvous? In Figure 4,
we plot the expected information gain from the first sample (E[ |Io(∆t)|| F˜o]) (solid line), and the
corresponding survival function So(∆t) (dotted line). It can be seen that the expected information
gain is maximum at t = 42, but with a 50% survival probability, hence depending on the costs Co,
C1 and Cr, the optimal policy may favor an earlier rendezvous (i.e. δpi∗o < 42) in order to keep
the survival probability within a reasonable limit and at the same time attain a reasonable level of
informativeness.
4 Conclusions
We developed a model for decision-making with endogenous information acquisition under time
pressure, where a decision-maker needs to issue a conclusive decision before an adverse event (po-
tentially) takes place. We have shown that the optimal policy has a ”rendezvous” structure, i.e. the
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optimal policy sets a ”date” for gathering a new sample whenever the current information sample is
observed. The optimal policy selects the time between two information samples such that it balances
the information gain (surprise) with the survival probability (suspense). Moreover, we characterized
the optimal policy’s continuation and stopping conditions, and showed that they depend on the con-
text and not just on beliefs. Our model can help understanding the nature of optimal decision-making
in settings where timely risk assessment and information gathering is essential.
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